

WHY THE SEA ORG IS SUCCESSFUL

*A lecture given on
17 October 1969*

55 min

Thank you.

Well, this is the 17th of October, 1969, in the year of refit.

Well, there are a lot of things I could talk to you about in relationship to the Sea Org. Actually, a tremendous amount of technology has been written up and they're in Base Orders and Flag Orders and so on. And very often people don't look into these and very often you find one of them screamingly out.

For instance, I'll give you an example: There's an awning support now stretched across the after well deck which has to be taken down because it's not demountable and you'd never get a boat out of there. And there is your Division Two, Planning, do you see, over into Operations without a liaison between the two. So there couldn't have been a liaison from Four, the Deck Division, to Two saying, "Hey, you know, we keep boats on the after well deck," for the plan in the first place. Do you see? And then there's, Two didn't catch it on an observation action so that it went in.

Now, all of this says that nearly every operation in which you're engaged is a cooperative endeavor. And the basic way that an organization breaks down is guys commit little overts that they don't really much say anything about, even the overt of ignorance, and then they consider themselves very bad and tend to individuate.

And this is the way the world sort of goes. Guys commit little overts and then they individuate and then they super-super-specialize on their post. And their post ceases to be a cooperative post with the remainder of the organization, and the organization becomes not an organization at all but a whole bunch of little islands, each one trying to float around independently, trying not to commit too many overts.

And then somebody at the top, to get anything going, has to somehow or another bust through this, not understanding what he is busting through, really, and get something done somehow. And then you hear officers start to shout, and you hear snarls and barks of various kinds.

Now, the ordinary defense of an organization against snarling and barking is to tell each other that people shouldn't snarl and bark. And I can assure you that that is no defense of any kind whatsoever. Because that anybody is snarling and barking means only one of two things: (1) he can't find out or doesn't understand what is going on but he doesn't like it, and (2) the guys around there haven't taken care of it already, which they should have.

Now, you could even put it down: Why do Sea Org officers shout? The way to keep a Sea Org officer from shouting is not to put it about that he's very bad because he shouts and sort of look reproving and ARC broken or even to get desperate and prevent shouting from occurring, but to observe and do the job in the first place.

Now, the cycle of breakdown—I'll give it to you again: The guy commits

little overts, he sort of feels a bit degraded, he doesn't feel like he's quite there, he's not quite important enough, he's not quite able enough, he's not quite educated enough to do the job and by omission or commission—and omission is about twice as serious an offense as commission; leaving something undone—and as a result the fellow says, "Well now, if I just pull in all of my flippers, here, into my shell and do my little job . . . They talk about hold your post—well, I'll just move this up to a totality, you see, and I will do my post very carefully and maybe I will stay out of trouble."

I don't know why the hell you're so worried about staying out of trouble. I'm several quadrillion years old by now and I've never been in anything else. There's one thing you can say about this universe, is that anybody in it is in trouble. So I don't know why you should object to it as though it is something new, novel and strange.

The way to really get into trouble is to concentrate on staying out of trouble. Now you've got yourself vis-a-vis with a total fixation and nothing will happen and you'll sure be in trouble.

- But sometimes somebody coming in new to the Sea Org, some kind of an evolution or a situation occurring, and they will hear a voice raised to high heaven, shaking the timbers, and they will say, "They have bad tempers." No, no. They've got some people who goof. That is the analysis of that situation.

(Now, the way to ungoof is to do it right in the first place and the best way to do it right in the first place is to hell with whether I'm in trouble or not. The real way to get into trouble is not do anything.)

You'll notice that the characters who have really gone downscale are artists at doing nothing. They're artists at doing nothing and they're in trouble the whole way. There is no exception to this rule. They get in trouble all over the place.

And then, of course, it becomes incomprehensible because they're not doing anything. Probably the only reason that we ever got into trouble in Dianetics and Scientology is we didn't put our big claws on the whole, cotton-picking planet in the first place and very broadly apply technology. Because obviously, the society is in a no-auditing condition.

You can go along just so far in a community without furnishing any service as an auditor, and if you know how to do things and if you know how to cure things and you won't do them and you won't cure them, the next thing you know the society gets mad at you. That's true. That's true.

It's actually not pushing it hard enough and making it available enough to a sufficient enough distance that got us into trouble.

Now, occasionally we fight with the powers that be, and they snarl and sniff and do various things, and we find out however . . . The odd part of it is, we have to do a considerable amount to defend ourselves, but the funny part of it is that those characters are in far more trouble than we are. This is very interesting, but they're *really* in trouble. They're not doing their job at all. All they're doing is interfering with somebody who is trying to do his job. So it's an interesting picture as you look at it.

If we were totally dedicated in Scientology to staying out of trouble, do you know what would happen? We wouldn't do any auditing, processing or training of any kind whatsoever, we wouldn't organize any place, and then next life and the next life and the next life we would just be in more and more and more trouble, because things would be more and more and more confused. Do you see?

So that's sort of what happens when a crew member starts individuating. They individuate, they pull their flippers into their sea-turtle shell and they say, "Now, if I just exactly hew the line . . . And I know that there's a hole in the hull but that's not my department." You start getting destruction by specialization.

Now, an organization that is so composed of a bunch of superindividuals

will eventually cause all of them a great deal of trouble. They will have trouble. They're generating their own trouble. That is because they do not cooperate. Their liaison lines and communication lines, just as beings, are out. And as a result they don't cooperate well.

A team has a tendency to know what the other team members are doing and thinking and coordinate thereby and therewith. And that is the definition of a team: It is people who cooperate one with another to push forward a common purpose. And they normally get along great. Now, the trick is to be an individual and be a member of the team at the same time. The only way one solves that is just come uptone until he can do it. Nobody is trying to make a pattern individual with processing or anything else—training or anything. Nobody is really trying to make a pattern individual. This information is available, these technologies and so on are applicable, they are sound and they're usable. But if that starts wiping out the individual, why, then you have lost to that degree, because it is individual initiative working in the midst of a team and making things go right that eventually brings the whole thing off.

Now, one of the reasons the Sea Org is successful, where perhaps a land organization might not be, is because of the challenge of the environment. Now, man in the last few thousand years has risen up from being a food animal—which is about all he was when he was decorating the trees; a food animal for saber-tooth tigers—he has graduated himself up the line to a point where, having wiped out most of the animal kingdom and having conquered physically a great many of the diseases and bugs and natural catastrophes, or at least defended himself against them, he has achieved an environment in which he falsely feels safe. He falsely feels safe in this environment, and he feels there is not much challenge in the environment.

You take a welfare state—a welfare state is all very well unless it is run by something like a welfare agency. The welfare agency inevitably and invariably will spread out into a totalitarianism which will crush the individual absolutely, so that every portion of a person's life is superregulated, and you eventually get a totalitarianism. These are horrible. Nobody wants anything to do with them.

There is a point, however, where the individual who has individuated ceases to become or be an effective member of the state. So a state is composed of individuals who can work cooperatively. That takes pretty good individuals.

So as you improve individuals you eventually work uphill to a point where you have a cooperative action, which was the ambition in the first place of the totalitarian state. But it was included . . . included in that ambition was the crushing of the individual. So it's a nice trick.

So the organizational target in the Sea Org, in actual fact, is the improvement of the individual where while remaining as an individual he can work in full cooperation with the organization. Because we have technology in this line we have some chance of actually attaining this goal.

But from the viewpoint of somebody trying to make a unit or a ship going, it very often looks very backward to him indeed because the challenge of the environment on land is entirely different than that on the sea. Sometimes the space of a minute and a half in the handling of ships can mean the difference between total disaster for any and all around and complete safety. The action not taken in that minute and a half can spell the doom of all aboard.

So cooperation is enforced, and effectiveness and efficiency is enforced. It's enforced by the environment because on ships and at sea you are not dealing with an environment which is without challenge. It is a challenging environment.

By this you predict what's going to happen, you can predict this or that, you can complain about how this or that is, and at the same time try to move it up and improve it.

Conditions of life in actual fact are not apparently as easy as sitting some place on land. So you do have a challenging environment that does tend to enforce, itself, cooperation. And every once in a while some situation will occur where the lookout has not seen the "blank" and the Conning Officer, having noticed that "blank" has already been deprived of the two or three or four minutes necessary to take the safe action and now has to take an action in total desperation to save the situation, and does. Well, don't expect him at the same time to take it pleasantly.

Now, one of the things that happens is that people who do not actually appreciate what is going on or see the situation or understand the operating environment too well, do not understand why immediate action is vitally necessary at that particular moment. And very often, in the wog world, the people do not understand why it is necessary to take an action at this particular time, they do not take the action, and the next thing you know it is glug, glug, glug or six feet of earth or not even the dignity of a burial.

A long time since, many of the governments on the planet should have taken action—a long time ago. And they didn't take them and they now find themselves in various political troubles. Now they don't even have anybody around who's trying to solve them in desperation. And if you don't think civilizations die, you should have been with us looking at all kinds of ruins during 1968. We were around looking at all manner of ruins. They're the most ruined ruins you ever saw in your life. Not only ruined by politics, incompetence and time, but then ruined again by the archaeologists digging them back up.

When you have seen the number of civilizations around, or have any idea of the number of civilizations around, which have risen and fallen, or the number of countries which have risen and fallen, you get some sort of an idea that the situation isn't often well cared for. Things happen and they are not taken care of by the team.

The team that was there—well, they had their individuation and too many fish to fry and not enough technology to operate with, and all kinds of various oddities entered into the situation. They were special interest groups and they were trying to get *theirs* out of the treasury, and they were mad at somebody who was an official in the government so they wouldn't cooperate. And we were around looking at some of these places and they certainly . . . Well, looking at ruins is one thing, you know, but how about just a bare plain that was once a thriving civilization.

Well, people in the current civilization are actually so far from taking action necessary to resolve any situation (it's not that I'm being critical on the matter. I mean, the record is right there) that the next thing you know, they're going to be in the soup.

World War II should never have happened. World War I should never have happened. What did they solve? World War I was to make the world safe for democracy and after that time we got dictators. We got US totalitarianism beginning to raise its ugly head. Democracy be damned.

World War II was somehow or other to make the world safe from fascism, and the US turned something like 750 million human beings under the totalitarian Russian yoke in World War II. These are political failures of great magnitude. Do you see?

Well, a situation can deteriorate, and in the wog world they don't even seem to notice that it's deteriorating. They don't do anything about it. They don't lay out any program of advance on the matter. You don't hear any wise statement made or somebody say . . . Even the revolutionary is usually talking balderdash. It's just how *bad* the fellow in charge is or how *bad* the system is or how *bad* the establishment is. He doesn't even offer a better establishment. At least he ought to do that.

So they actually don't have any idea of keeping the machine going. They don't have any idea of keeping it running, and they are too stupid to recognize that this unchallenging environment they're looking—it has very long

fangs that are about to snap their heads straight off. Do you see what the situation is?

So you can actually be in a very challenging environment without recognizing there is anything challenging about it. The best frame of mind to enter this thing in is the frame of mind of perception and observation to see if you can figure it out.

Now, I have told you, in talking to you, some very, very horrible, disastrous warnings, gruesome . . . I didn't tell you that if you really want to become depressed, read some coast pilots. And you can see . . . two or three watch officers, they get together you know, and they're up there on the bridge, and they're going to go through this strait. So they open up the coast pilot, you see, and they read in the coast pilot about going through this strait. They're all happy about going through this strait; there's water in there, you know, and everything. They read in the coast pilot—"And there's an offshore lying reef one and three quarters miles with the least water of six feet over it. And there's this and that. And very often the williwaws and storms come down from the peaks and blow at a rate of blaugh which beaches vessels in all *dir-blah-brum!*" And you say, "Gee, that's a bad one. Let's find another strait." And you open it up and you read that one, and it is much, much worse. Now there are reefs in the middle of the fairway. It is the most discouraging activity you ever got into.

One time up in Alaska on an expedition, myself and a chap that was serving as a crew member, opened it up to find out how in the name of God we were going to get south. We had already overstayed our time to a point where the ship . . . It was very bitterly cold and the sun was not now rising above the horizon and we had stayed north too long.

As a matter of fact, in going south, we were just a matter of hours ahead of the forming sea ice. We really ran. But in planning this cruise, we opened up the Alaskan Pilot, and we opened this up to find out how you got south without staying in near the coast. And it seems like you go five hundred miles out to sea except for the tremendous gales which occur out there in the middle of the fog which is impenetrable. You can never see the sky so you don't know your position. And in getting out there, there are innumerable shoals, rocks and islands into which you're going to collide. But the compass is seldom correct because of the magnetic anomaly.

And we read about all these storms and the methods of getting south and it just got worse, and it got worse, and it got worse. And finally it got much too bad for either of us to support anymore, and we broke out into just roars of laughter. We absolutely were sick with hysterics. We must have laughed for two or three hours. We'd read another sentence, "And then large waves very often drive ships . . ." and we'd break out again. It was just too much.

And finally we put it down and we said to hell with it, drew a line on a course on a coast which didn't even have its coastline marked in on the chart, and went south anyway lickety-split, just ahead of the forming skim ice and we got out of there.

I remember the most pleasant part of that cruise—totally irrelevant. Conning was a matter of trying to stay unsolidified. And so what we did was pass hot rums up from the galley to the guys who were steering and conning, and we just kept a bucket line of hot rums up to whoever was on watch. And this kept them thawed out. It was Hudson's Bay Rum, 135 proof.

The cold, in actual fact, was so intense that the rum had no effect at all except to sort of warm you up a little bit. Wild experience. Then when the guys couldn't stand up on the bridge anymore, we'd send them below and send another watch up.

Anyway . . . But I remember the sun. We eventually got south far enough to rise the sun. And the sun one noon came up above the horizon as the coldest, palest ball—sort of white—and it came up above the horizon and for

ten minutes was above the horizon and then sank out of sight again. But we were awfully glad to see that sun.

Anyway, that is a little bit more of a challenging environment than most people count on. But you can get into these.

But the main point which I'm making—the fact that the environment is challenging at sea is obvious. And one gets to a position where he starts coping with what he finds.

He starts coping with his environment. And if you can get somebody to start coping with their environment, they can confront MEST, they can confront the general surroundings, where they are, they get a level of estimation, and they're not just walking down streets hoping somehow it'll be all right. But they actually move up to cause over their environment. And at sea, you are either at cause over your environment or you are dead. Do you see, there's a slight difference here.

These are some of the factors which were not thought of particularly or designed. We kind of got into the Sea Org activity sort of gradually and accidentally, and we moved further ahead not actually on a planned idea. We just knew it was going all right in this direction and we kept going further in this direction. And the further we went in this direction, the more we developed in this direction, why, the better things were getting, and as a result it sort of evolved into what we are now. It wasn't some sudden idea that Ron likes the sea so we will all go out into some boats.

As a matter of fact the basic history of the Sea Org is that we had a crew training program at St. Hill and then we got the *Diana* and it came south under vast duress. And then we got the *Athena* and it came south and got repaired under very vast duress. But meanwhile the—then called the *Enchanter* carried out quite a few very vital and quite successful missions and the *Athena* carried out some very, very successful missions. These were ship missions. And then this ship came along to be used as an AO. And when it could no longer be used as an AO, we suddenly realized that it was a better operating ship, just as itself, than the others and so retained it and continued to operate with it.

It was after . . . someplace during that line that we suddenly found out—I think it was really about September of 1967 when we actually began to realize that there was some result that we had not achieved before on the basis of missionairing, of handling organizations with missions, with trying to patch things up and put them together from a central operating area and we evolved it from about there.

As we've gone along, what we have learned of seafaring and what has been put together along that has normally been written up in FOs, AB checksheets and so on. What we've known of missionairing and so on now appears in the Mission School checksheets. And there isn't any particular reason to it. We really can run missions. If the missionary is a well-trained missionary, boy, can he run missions.

And what we've actually done is evolved into a very high level—you might say—management unit (be one of the best ways to describe it). But we really are sort of a management unit. We actually, probably, are Division Five, Earth—Qual Earth. That's probably what we are. And we feel our way forward and we make progress.

Now, the people of the Sea Org are very valuable people and it takes quite a little while, actually, to make a fully trained Sea Org member. Let's take a look at these various skills.

Now we expect them to know their tech, which is at least HDG. We're expecting them to know their OEC. But these are relatively new expectancies. Originally we expected them to be able to do their AB checksheet, to be able to do their ship duties and to be missionaries, and those are still expected.

Now, when you add to that HDG or Class VIII and OEC org expertness

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SKILLS OF A S.O. MEMBER

on top of that, you get what you might call a very super-able troubleshooter. They can put things together because they are running things right now. They're running orgs. We got into running orgs. But we generally can put together situations which are apparently almost beyond recovery.

The evolution, when the British government suddenly snarled and snapped and Callaghan—who I think is some kind of a foreigner in England—barred out all the Scientologists . . . Yes, I think he's a Celt from Eire, or someplace. He's some foreigner of some kind or another—Russian or something.

And anyway, when he suddenly chopped down on our students to save the situation, why, we not only had to loft AO UK as a whole operating organization, we also had to loft a complete St. Hill. And we did so and the evolution came off with a smoothness that would have surprised almost anybody. It was amazing. It was absolutely amazing.

But, as I say, it stretched us a little bit thin and when we were stretched that thin, why, we haven't quite been as able to put out as many corrective missions as we had. So now we're evolving a new pattern where, with even a very few numbers, we can do our job better than we were doing our job before. In other words, we're coping with our environment.

Therefore, there is a lot to this Sea Org. There is a lot to it. And it has tremendous disadvantages—tremendous disadvantages. I wouldn't at any moment begin to say that it was all cream. But the disadvantages which it has are normally the disadvantages of lack of know-how. Trouble is caused by any mission that fails—greater or lesser degree, trouble will occur if a mission has failed even though it's a minor mission.

Well, that's know-how on the management line. But let's move back onto the ship. If a ship can't operate and if it can't keep its schedules and it can't be here and it can't sail when it's got to sail and so on, then the whole operating pattern is shoved out of gear. Well, the reason why ships have to be refitted is they're not kept up. Any refit actually is a criticism of maintenance. Anything which is not properly maintained will have to be repaired. You can write that in letters of fire. If something isn't oiled, it'll eventually have to be repaired. If something isn't painted, it will eventually have to be thoroughly chipped and painted, you see. If a rail isn't given a coat of varnish when it should have it, it will now have to be *totally* scraped down to bare wood and given its coat of varnish, just because somebody didn't give it a lick-and-a-promise coat of varnish when it should have had it. Do you understand?

It's when maintenance fails, when upkeep fails, you get into the field of repair. And repair can slow the living daylights out of any operational situation.

Now, maintenance is basically alertness. Alertness to what's going on. Now, we have systems which assist that alertness, such as checksheets. And you've got a checksheet of all the electrical equipment on the ship or all the motors on the ship and so forth. Well, there's a checksheet that they've all got to be turned on once a week, one after the other. But I don't know right now if there is a checksheet which says each one of them has to be oiled or greased at periodic intervals. I don't know if there is such a checksheet.

Wherever that checksheet had a missing hole, maintenance isn't occurring and an electric motor is going to break down, and, and, and. And one night it's very hot weather and you're lying in your cabin and you can't breathe because it's too hot because the blowers are off. Well, it's one thing to snarl at the engineers but actually it is all our failure because it's a cooperative action. Actually, Division Two probably should have gotten out the checksheet for the oiling of all the electrical motors and then . . . and you wouldn't have had this motor, uninspected, running forever to a point of where it simply chewed itself up and all of a sudden wouldn't operate at all. You get the idea.

Now, as far as crew members are concerned, this is a very tough life. I

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wouldn't say it had any advantage at all; I don't know why you're here at all. It's a tough life—awful, actually. It must be—must be. Every once in a while I hear somebody saying that they have to go out into the wog world and they want to resign so that they can get their study in. I look at their study record on the ship and find out we've been study . . . they've been studying all the time on the ship, but they haven't been down to study on the ship. They never went near study, but they have to go outside to do it. These guys that really considered it a tough life actually never got into it to find out how tough it was. I'm joking when I say it is that rigorous. But Sea Org members actually work very hard. They work very well. But like all activities and organizations, why, many are called and few are chosen.

But truthfully, the people who are here have elected themselves here. Nobody's forcing them to stay here. Those people who go have normally committed overts, considered themselves too ignorant, considered themselves somehow or another, even down deep, a liability to the group, so they blow themselves off.

It's not true that somebody gets in trouble or gets a bad reputation. If you look over the bad reputations and ethics records and so forth back on the past history of most Sea Org members, it reads like the inhabitants of Leavenworth. Comm Ev, Treason—you know, this sort of thing.

Now, a lot of being a management activity or in control of things is the ability to put in ethics, and I suppose if you get enough motivators you get familiar with it. I'd say somebody who hadn't had a Comm Ev or two wouldn't be able to function at all.

The truth is, people seldom pay any attention to this sort of thing. Over a long period of time, they every once in a while we'll find out somebody hasn't ever run a successful mission or hasn't ever done a this or hasn't done a that, and they'll start riding them a little bit. The guy knows very well he hasn't. It's merely brought home to him that he is goofing. And instead of ungoofing it and figuring out what's right and getting it audited and a few other things and so on, why, he blows off in a panic. Now, that's actually how you normally will lose a recruit. He's more scared than he should be.

But the actual fact of the case is, as we move up the line, Sea Org members are more and more effective, more and more efficient. They can take care of things the like of which nobody ever heard of. And because they are all together and in the same environment, one with another, they never notice really their changes in effectiveness. It's never brought home to them. They're getting more and more effective. They're actually in a challenging environment. They're learning, recognizing and handling better and better and better those things which they are confronted with from day to day, and they're putting it right. And they get so they make these things run righter and righter. But they're all doing it as a group.

I suppose somebody brand new coming into the Sea Org would think that he was sort of out of pace for a while, but he would gradually get into a point where he was swinging with the rest of them, and he would also lose perspective on how he himself was improving. It is expected that a Sea Org member would be able to handle a situation and make things go right. Do you see?

So his improvement isn't noticed because it's expected of him.

Now, suddenly this character is transplanted out, even into a Scientology org, and he looks at what *his* standard would be and what around there is generally looked at as a recognized standard and he is instantly assaulted. His reality is assaulted, see? "These guys stink! What the hell is the matter with these—look what they're tolerating around—*wrrrh, ruoth-wrr!*" He'd chew into it and start straightening it out almost at a desperation level because it looks that bad, you see? And he goes ahead and he straightens it out.

What he really doesn't look at is that that Scientology organization is

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already running—for what it is doing and how it is doing it—is already running at a far, far higher level of competence than the area around it.

I don't think you realize that TWA and airline companies and other people in businesses and so forth only operate because they practically have somebody with a gun at their back ready to pull the trigger to go on functioning. The internal police actions of these big companies would startle you half to death. All it takes to get fired and shot from guns and deprived of all livelihood and be blacklisted forevermore as an airline hostess, you see, is forget to smile at a VIP.

"Well, Gracie didn't smile at a VIP. Here's . . ." Then to the Personnel Chief. "Gracie didn't smile at this VIP who came aboard—as a matter of fact, looked a little cross because he kept hitting her in the face," and so forth. And that's the end of Gracie. And then she goes over to United Airlines to try to get a job. And "What's your former experience?" "TWA." "Well, hmm, hmm. Bad employment record." That's it. She's finished, see? That's the duress level at which they hold in all that efficiency. They hold it in with an ax and a club.

Furthermore, they've got the whole society to drag from. And, in addition to that, they are actually served by outside training units. The training which is done outside those corporations serve those corporations. Let me exemplify what I mean.

The training which is done in business school on the subject of accounting serves TWA's Accounting Department because it answers all the income-tax queries. It doesn't get their accounts straight, but it certainly takes care of the government. You think I'm joking. That's all they run those accounting departments for anymore. And so the people who are brought in, actually . . . The cooks—well, they've been trained over in some cooking school in something.

Now, they have to do some of their own training but they are served by the society around them because they are performing skills and activities which are quite common and ordinary.

In Scientology, we are not served at all by the society around us. It is very good for a person to be very well trained in some line or another, and we're very happy when people are trained in this line. But the truth of the matter is that we ourselves are engaged in a highly technical, specialized activity not only on ships but also in orgs. Our actions as missionaries and management activities and planning and that sort of thing, don't at all compare with the commercial vessel tub-of-bolts, where the captain does all the work anyhow. It doesn't compare with commercial, it certainly doesn't compare with naval. We're not really much served in these directions. We're always glad to see some ex-naval individual show up, but he very often has some kind of an idea about officers, that they ought to be shoved overboard or something. Or he has other liabilities that perhaps he has to unlearn a bit and then eventually he learns these things and gets along all right.

But we're not, in actual fact, much served by exterior training. And that is because we are dealing, basically, with new technology and because we are very few and because we have a tremendously big job to do.

Now, the job that we do do out over the world is unbelievable. It's big. What we're shoving into line and holding straight and so on is not only very important but it is highly influential in the various currents of affairs.

If we were just in the business to fly an airplane from A to B and then turn the airplane around and fly it from B to A and make sure that some passengers were collected and put on board it and got the money and wrote it down in a book so that they could be flown from A to B and B to A, and that some freight was collected and put on board and flown from A to B and B to A, then all we'd have to do is make sure that we hired some mechanics who were trained someplace and they repaired the thing, and we get some pilots that have been trained by the US Army or Air Forces or somebody and

they'd fly the thing and you see, it's all served and it's all usual and there are all kinds of guys who know all about how to do this, so it all—very ordinary. See? Easy, because it fits.

Now, they're trying to make service a little bit better so they serve things on pink plastic instead of white plastic. Their idea . . . They say, "On Tuesdays and Thursdays you can fly free with your wife." That is to say, your wife can fly free on these days when they have low traffic days. This is *big* promotion, do you see?

These guys had to work it up for years and years and years and years. These guys had to work it up in order to get aviation itself promoted to a point where it would run as a usual action.

We actually are not up to a point where the world even has an idea that anybody could do anything about it or straighten it out in any way, see? We're actually three feet behind the world's head. And we're handling technology which is far, far, beyond the ordinary level of technology which man has. We're actually operating in advance of his scientific technology, we're operating in advance of his business technology, and a guy comes in from those fields, like an accountant—my God, if I ever get another trained accountant. He has to be untaught and straightened out because he hasn't got 135 people in his accounting department to mess up the books. Do you see? At that level of push and development and the amount of accounting which has to be done, you couldn't do it.

So the net result of that is that our actions are understandably very advanced technical actions and we have to fit ourselves to them. So we've got another challenge in our environment in that we're moving forward as pioneers in a new frontier, and we're having to keep this frontier expanding and handling at every side. And then the old guys, the Indians—or the aborigines; I wouldn't disgrace the Indians—the aborigines that are already trying to hold the territory around, with smoking their stone pipes and going "Ugh" . . . "Everybody ought to be killed," you see, is about the level of their technology.

We're actually operating in an area where it is an inverted line. They don't have the idea of curing anybody; the insane ought to be butchered. Wow, I mean, the disparity . . . The public is with us, but the field that we are in is actually operated by a bunch of guys who are operating it over their own dead bodies, practically. In other words, it's a rough area of action.

And because human minds are handling the problem of the human mind, it is infinitely rougher. If all you had to do was fit gaskets on a carburetor or something like that, that's one thing. But areas where you're handling the randomness of aberration become themselves rather random. So it takes a lot to hold together.

When you add all this up, the Sea Org has evolved itself into a very successful activity, and it is a very vital and necessary activity. And it, for instance, just disappeared out of the running for about six weeks and was not along the line, was not apparent on the comm lines of the world, and during that period of time stats went down very steeply and very badly, even though we ourselves had done something to beef them up before we stepped off those lines. So when we stepped off the lines the stats all went down.

And it has happened that way before. So we are a very necessary, very vital activity.

Now, sooner or later, we will break it through to a point where we are above the make-break point—the make-break point being that point where we are enough of us, activities are sufficiently large where they run at enough surplus of cash money and reserve, and so on, so that our services become more paid for. Right now we're in a level where although we're performing very necessary services all over the world, the income lines and that sort of thing are not really so arranged that they're on a point above this make-break point. We're worth far more than we get, that's for sure.

If you just go right down to the bottom of the line, a psychoanalysis, leading to nothing in five years, costs nine thousand pounds. Twenty-five hours of auditing in London is probably still fifty pounds. In twenty-five hours of auditing, you can take a guy all the way up through Dianetic Triples and Scientology Triples. Wow. A little difference. Yet the characters that are charging nine thousand pounds, why, try to complain about our prices. Do you see? We have trouble.

But sooner or later, we'll get up above this make-break point and there'll be enough money in and enough power on the line, recognizably, so that we don't have to watch every penny as it comes along. Right now we do. And there's where we're pushing forward toward and we are being successful and we are making it and we're moving right on up the line.

You look at our advancing international stat over the period of the last couple of years that we have been an organization, it is a continual advance and it is very high indeed. When we step off the line, it goes down; so we must be very valuable people. Sooner or later, we could even get up to a point of where we're paid for. But right now, why, we try to keep things going and the situation in which we operate seems to be novel, but it works and people seem to get better at it, and the truth of the matter is we're a howling success.

Very few Sea Org members ever really realize how much they're appreciated or what stature they have until they show up someplace in a Scientology org. And they show up in an org and if they're a Sea Org member about to carry out this, that or the other thing, they get one of two things: Either people go absolutely white, or they get snap, pop and courtesy compared to which VIPs wouldn't get. So, when you look at the actual effect, you recognize the amount of power there. And, of course, you retain the power to the amount that it is not abused.

Now, when you look over the entirety of the Sea Org you find out, then, that for Qual Five, Division Five, Planet Earth to be only composed at this time of about three hundred guys and gals is absolutely fantastic, when you figure out we're already handling one, two, three, four, five—five organizations, six or seven ships and the management activity of Flag. And this is done by about three hundred guys and gals? Oh, wait a minute, that's impossible. Every government knows absolutely that to organize and to handle that much and so on, it would easily take four or five hundred thousand people.

And in the degree and what we really accomplish for our numbers is fantastic. The one guy who never seems to find out about this, really, however, is the Sea Org member. He just goes on doing his job.

Thank you very much.