

THIRD DYNAMIC ACTIVITY AND MAKING THINGS GO RIGHT

*A lecture given on
20 October 1969*

48 min

Thank you.

Well, this is the 20th of October, 1969. This is actually the fourth lecture in a series.

The dynamic on which the Sea Org seems to operate is the third. It seems to operate on the third toward the fourth. And nothing is more plainly evident in that than the traditional willingness of the members of this organization to work on post, often under very trying circumstances and to get the job done. It's amazing, actually.

And if you want to upset things in the Sea Org, why, you try to move it over onto the first dynamic. Now, this is very peculiar. It doesn't work this way in industry or according to the social sciences. In other words, it doesn't go by the psychology textbooks and it doesn't go by capitalism because if you try to enforce an award in the Sea Org, you get into trouble. That's the truth of the matter. It's fantastic. You try to enforce on a Sea Org member such a thing as study and even, sometimes, auditing, and if you do this on too broad a scale, you actually practically shatter morale.

This is a very hard thing to understand. It doesn't go according to the textbook at all. For instance, the study breakdowns normally occur because of scheduling. And the scheduling on post and to get the job done—the theoretical scheduling, actually, doesn't really permit enough time to get the job done. And then when the scheduling includes study, or something of that sort, and then an enforcement is attempted to keep the scheduling in, you're liable to be looking at a mutiny. I mean, definitely, this is the result of survey, not my say-so, because it defies logic.

Every now and then in the past we have had somebody—they weren't doing very well on the job. They weren't doing very well, they'd never done very well, and they have gone off someplace in order to be able to do full-time study. I actually think, however, that this was basically the result that they were given the compulsion to study but didn't have time to.

And in all of the time of the Sea Org, I don't really know of any instances of people complaining about—from the first dynamic aspect, of long hours on post or quantity of work to be accomplished on board or organizationally, or something like this—I don't have any complaints in that direction.

I have complaints in the direction that they're distracted from their post by trying to do something to them. It even goes up to the third dynamic sometimes, which is quite amusing. Very funny. I have had a suggestion by somebody who was going around saying that we all ought to have a party of some kind or another, and all I have heard from officers and crew members is "We don't have time for it" and snapping and snarling about the whole thing, all of which sort of works backwards.

So, anyhow, you get from that that it's a very hard organization to understand. There are certain certainties and stable data about the Sea Org which you can fairly well count on, and that is that people one way or the

other will try to get the job done. You can count on that. It may be sometimes disorganized and knuckleheaded, and sometimes maybe the job isn't worth doing, but they will try to get the job done. And you can count on a willingness to find out what the right way to run it or do it was. You get that willingness.

Peculiarly absent in the Sea Org, in spite of ethics conditions, innumerable Comm Evs—I think we probably average one Comm Ev per person per year in the Sea Org, and probably a low condition per person per month, something like the averages on the thing. And if you stood outside all of this parade of ethics conditions and looked at it, you could say, "Boy, those guys are a lot of bad hats, boy. Boy, they . . . they really . . . they're really a lot of tough eggs."

The truth of the matter is, I know of no instance in the Sea Org since its inception, of anybody willingly or maliciously doing anything to injure anything or sabotage anything in the Sea Org. Isn't that interesting? I know of no instance. And remember, we're the experts on that sort of thing. We put people on E-Meters and find out what the score is.

We have had the factor of somebody who felt he was doing the group in or was tripping over things or goofing up and he would say this, or infer it one way or the other, that he was a danger to the organization and he would blow off. We have had that happen, which is quite the reverse.

I am in a very good position to know this because I have C/Sed, really, the majority of cases that have been audited in the Sea Org. And after this, that or the other thing has happened, why, generally the person will show up in Review and you will get the C/S having to do with an assessment or ARC breaks or something of that sort. And when you get all this down and you find out what the answers are, the strange and rather pathetic fact is that even on the worst goofs, why, the causation behind it is rather pitiful, really. I mean, the guy is really in bad shape because he feels bad for having done this. So I can say with truth that this is why people have left the Sea Org. They have said they wanted full-time study, they have said this, they have said that, they have said other things. But if you look in their case folders or get their final Review data and so on, it's because they feel they are not really worthy of the group or are liable to louse things up. All of which is quite remarkable.

The things people will put up with in the Sea Org are fantastic. And . . . Well, I can be counted on to try to make things go right and other officers usually can be counted on to make things go right, and other people can be, and in spite of this, there are certain areas where they seem to go wrong, and one of those areas is food. This is very remarkable. It's up to the group, actually, to generate the operating climate in which the group operates. And you can issue all sorts of orders if you want to, and unless they agree to some degree with the group's mores or purposes, they won't get executed. And one of the most difficult things to get executed in the Sea Org is just plain chow. Sounds weird.

People look on it as a first dynamic thing, if you want to analyze it. And they don't make, actually . . . There are complaints around but as many times as there have been complaints or upsets about food, and I or someone else have put those things right, it tends to go out again. Well, if there was real pressure there, I can assure you that that area would clean up, and it wouldn't have to be cleaned up all the time by me.

There's an old gag that I pull every once in a while, which is single-handing a ship. Well, I really . . . it doesn't worry me at all to single-hand a ship. Now, that means run it all by yourself. That doesn't mean run it administratively by yourself, that means steer it and turn the engines over and navigate it and you know, all that. That's single-handing a ship. You got an idea of that with Francis Chichester, when he was pushing that bucket of bolts around the world where it should never have gone. That's single-handing.

SWAG - [unclear] / [unclear]



And when you have an almost totally untrained crew, why, the man who is in charge is, of course, left with the task of single-handing because they don't really know what to do, no matter how willing they are, and they don't know what to look for for a while. And there is always a period there where a new ship, new crew, and so on, has to be single-handed. Somebody's single-handing it. If they don't, why, some catastrophe or another will occur. And single-handing is also done by every watch officer. And the con or Conning Officer who has control of the bridge actually has to do a small amount of single-handing every time he gets a green watch member. Even if he has just one green watch member, there is going to be some section there that he himself is going to have to be alert for.

So, single-handing—if he had a totally green watch, the Conning Officer would be single-handing the vessel. And somebody's got to keep it running and then gradually, why, the watch or the ship will learn the ropes and begin to back you up and take the ship off your plate and it'll begin to go.

This inevitably occurs. It's sometimes a long and arduous process in which it is occurring, but whoever is in control of a unit or section of the Sea Org actually does operate on the principle of himself somehow getting the job done while he gets people or gets people trained up to a point of helping him get the job done. And that is normally the process by which one keeps things running.

This is not a strange process nor a new one, particularly, but it is one which recurs continuously in the Sea Org.

Now, we go on the relatively outrageous principle that if a person is on post, he knows how to do everything on that post, regardless of whether he does or not. See, it's the unreasonable expectancy. Actually, oddly enough, people live up to that expectancy very well. You'll see the general situation in ship handling improve, improve, improve, improve, improve. Well, that is to the degree that the ship is not now being single-handed but is being handed by more and more people.

In other words, every time we have an individual action occurring, it builds rapidly up into a third dynamic action. In other words, we build a first dynamic action out of existence. Do you follow me? The first dynamic action is not tolerated. I mean, it's not just let go on, you know. People don't just let it go on being a first dynamic action.

Now, the only exception to that is the galley, of course, and apparently the Sea Org is perfectly willing to let a cook go on single-handing the galley while being served lousy chow. I mean, this is one of those puzzles that gets built into organizations.

And there used to be an old gag on the *Athena*. I had it worked out how I could go out on deck, throw off the lines, go down and open up the oil feed on the boilers, open up the throttle, go through the galley—when you go from the engine room up to the bridge you can easily go through the galley—go through the galley, stir the cook's dinner (or stir the crew's dinner), and then go up on the bridge and then turn the wheel and so on, to get it going in the right direction. People looked on that as simply a joke. But the truth of the matter is it came true. I find myself repeatedly having to stir the cook's soup for him and feed the crew, because they don't seem to do that well.

I'm always writing orders: "The crew will be fed."

Now, I worried about the *Apollo* for quite a while because actually I couldn't figure any way to single-hand her. And I couldn't figure any way to do all these jobs on a ship which was 3200 tons and about 320 feet in length, twin-screw, diesel. And I finally, not too long ago, managed to figure out how you did it. You opened up the cattle doors on either side, and you went up on deck and got the lines thrown off and got them aboard. And then you went down and with those cattle doors open, you could run in and open or close the twin screw throttles, don't you see, to get her backed out from the dock, by going out and peeking through the cattle doors and rushing back into the

EVANGELINE

1st - 3rd

3rd - 4th

SINCE
ON
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engine room. And then, eventually, when you got her clear of the dock, why, you could set them ahead at some speed or another and get up on the bridge in time to steer it.

Now, that was all very well, but I couldn't figure any way . . . Actually, it's not quite complete. I couldn't figure any way to get through the galley and stir the crew's soup.

But people thought I was joking when I was talking about single-handing the ship away from a dock all by myself. But the truth of the matter, I wasn't. And it frankly could be done.

Now, we have had instances where I've single-handed a vessel but wasn't permitted to do so very long. People start coming up and taking the ship away from me. You know, they take pieces of it, one right after the other, you know? And I almost drove a crew frantic one time by insisting on single-handing something on the *Enchanter* and that was a very upset crew.

They were supposed to have gone down and dived the night before and untangled the anchors. They had two anchors out, and they were tangled. They were supposed to have gone down and undone those the night before and that order was neglected. That was a neglected order; they didn't do that. They were supposed to get out and operate at 1:00 o'clock, 1300 the next day, they were supposed to have sailed.

Well, at 1300 the next day, the anchors were still tangled and they were not about to leave harbor. And the Captain of her at that time actually had started the crew training on the ship's org book at that time. And this was unfortunate.

So at 1300, seeing no activity on the decks, why, I went up and started bringing in the anchors. I think I checked out the engine to see whether or not it'd run and then went up and started bringing in the anchors.

Well, they were crossed, and very difficult, because one anchor was trying to raise the other anchor and they were all wadded up. And trying to get those two anchors up off of the harbor bottom was quite difficult. I managed to get a boat hook and pull them apart a little bit and then I managed to haul them up high enough to get them off the floor of the harbor.

Well, the truth of the matter is, Mary Sue, who was aboard, immediately started pitching in, and she went down below and closed all the portholes and did all the things necessary to get the ship to sea. I had one anchor holding the other anchor up off the bottom, went back aft, got her engine going well and got her out into deep water, and then dropped both anchors, and dropped them way out on their chain. And because they could hang way down now, they disentangled and I managed to get them back up again.

It was a very pathetic action, because various members of the crew kept coming forward while I was doing all this, saying, "Can't I help?" They looked very abashed. They were quite upset, actually. And by the time I got both anchors into the hawsepipe and got her sailing and going along all right, why, one after the other had actually taken over this piece and that piece of the operation of the ship, and she was fully operating. And by the time we anchored again, why, her crew was her crew.

It was an interesting experience from a viewpoint of morale. I have never seen people quite so worried or quite so upset as when their help wasn't used and they were excluded out as far as the group was concerned.

Well, it was an amusing instance, but the truth of the matter is that it is almost impossible to do anything by yourself. You sooner or later will pull in assistance, and people will begin to handle the situation, unless interfered with or expressly forbidden, and even then, will form up into a third dynamic activity, which is interesting.

Now, where we fall down, then, whenever we do fall down, is to try to maintain something as a single activity or not to back up posts which are overloaded. And there's where we do badly. And that is basically because we are overexpanded to a marked degree, we have too many things to do, we are holding things and keeping them going in too many parts of the world to do

it comfortably. So we go on and do it, but we do it rather uncomfortably.

And lacking enough hands to do this and lacking enough trained personnel, lacking enough people to get the show on the road and get it done, we very often tend to short up certain functions, and this then tends to overload them.

So, what one has to keep in mind is the following cycle: The . . . A green crew, by the way, always knows the Captain's name. This is about all they know of organization; they know the Captain's name. You can always tell when they are starting to groove in, because they go and see somebody else about something beside the Captain.

And a green crew will evolve into a competent crew. But the actual cycle of organization is you have a ship there, or a base, and then you put a crew there, and then the crew runs the ship, or the base, and the product of that crew is an operating org.

Now, when you start in at the beginning, there are so many things exterior to that activity that need to be handled right now. "That telex just came in, and so on and so on and so on. And do you know that New York . . . raa-aya-daaa! . . . And WW and so on. And we've got to get somebody out right now. And Franco just had fits and is . . . you know. Got to get it done!"

So we go on doing that and we get to operating on some kind of an external third dynamic activity while we are still trying to keep things running. Well, sooner or later, we have to take the actual step of putting a crew there to have the product of an operating organization.

See, the product of that crew is an org. And when we've got that org functioning, then we can put in other orgs and handle other actions and other lines.

But because we have to do it all at once, in spite of it all, why, very often this point of putting a crew there as your first initial action gets neglected. And even after it's done, the emergencies and so on which are going on externally and which have to be handled at thousands of miles away or hundreds of miles away, that have to be handled—these conditions tend to strip the crew back down again. So it's actually a cycle of putting a crew there; it's stripped back down by emergency operation here; and then putting a crew there; and it's stripped down by emergency actions and mission actions; and putting a crew there. And eventually, if you keep that up, you'll eventually make it so that they can then put an org there which can handle these wild things that are going on and which have to be handled by the Sea Org. Do you see?

Now, in the period of time before a crew is really there, you have all kinds of wild things going on. You have ships being single-handed; you have Conning Officers up there who are doing everything, including steer; you have an engine room that the Chief on some watches actually has to run them from his bunk; you have these weird things going on where single-handing is occurring because simply nobody has put a crew there. So, that is your first action.

But of course, the purposes of the Sea Org in handling and controlling things are actually senior to producing or putting orgs there. So, it happens that we really get torn to pieces by the urgencies of actions which have to be undertaken by us regardless of it all, and our internal organization suffers badly, and we have to remember, we have to keep it in mind, that even though we are handling these things and so on, we must keep an eye out to the fact that we have to have a basic internal organization there, a crew there, so it can have a product of putting an org there which has the product of putting orgs there. Do you follow?

And where we neglect that original step is where the Sea Org member gets overworked, rather harassed, rather knocked around. I haven't heard people complain. But that's what's, maybe, the pride of the Sea Org, see. They don't, they go on and get the work done. But if they're too hard pressed and you start distracting them by insisting they study or insisting that or

something of the sort . . . If they're too hard pressed, they tend to almost do their nut because it's too much distraction off of trying to get the job done. They're already short-handed in doing it. Do you follow? That's really what happens.

Now, if you have the three main divisions of the ship, particularly a large vessel, well covered, you won't have too much trouble. And the three actions which have to be covered, really have to be covered . . . And we've shorted these up time and time again, and every time we have done it we have built up fantastic amounts of work for the next lot that comes on. And that is the engine room. The engine room has to be fully manned and it's a very liberally manned engine room and it has to be a well-manned engine room. Otherwise little bits and pieces start breaking down, the next thing you know nobody could run it no matter how many people you put in there. There has to be a good stewards . . . cooks-and-stewards setup. That has to be handled and functioning and not shorted up and a good deck force.

Now, all else on a ship's crew can be skeletally handled. But those can't be. You've got to have your engine room, your cooks and stewards and your deck force. And those things have got to be handled. If those are not fully manned, or adequately manned, then the crew will be unable to put an org there and the org to that degree will suffer because it will not be able to have a product of controlling and handling other orgs and situations.

So, what happens is that in the anxiety to handle this or that emergency, we forget to put the crew there, and then the crew shorted up, gets very badly mauled around and nobody could do that amount of work. And then we have to remember to put that crew there. And if we do that, why, it will all come out smoothly. Do you see?

So that is the only cycle, actually, which I can tell you by long experience that tends to be neglected. What happens? We have three engineers, or we have two engineers, and they happen to be very good auditors and they know their tech. Do you follow? So some screaming tech emergency occurs someplace or another and we take one of those engineers and send him off to Keokuk. We don't put somebody back even for the period when he's gone. See? We don't put somebody back there. We don't fill in that slot. When this thing starts happening, the funny part of it is that the urgency of some operation may take the other engineer too. And then you suddenly ring up on the bells to—*reductio ad absurdum*—you ring up on the engine room telegraphs to go full speed astern and there is no reply.

And, similarly, people underestimate the amount of personnel which is vital, necessary and required in the third division, the Purser's area. They underestimate this personnel and all kinds of wild things happen. They're supposed to take care of their expenses and economics, you see, and supposed to do all their books. All right, that's full part-time. And then they're supposed to buy all the food and issue it. Now, those are two rather full-time jobs all by themselves. And then they're supposed to have three meals a day, and then they're supposed to wash all the dishes and serve those meals too. And then clean out all of the berthings and keep those all neat and straight somehow, or the internal compartments of the ship. So we put one person in the third division.

Well, I'll give them credit. Over the past time, I've actually seen them try to do it all. It's very remarkable. I've actually seen them try.

And then they get into tons of trouble, because, of course, their accounts aren't up. They don't know where the money went. It wasn't run on financial planning. They can't find their receipts. And what happened to the last hundred pounds of cabbages, nobody knows. Do you see what happens?

So we can normally be credited with being highly inefficient. And that inefficiency . . . in such areas. We could be credited with terrible inefficiency in that area, whereas the truth of the matter is we probably are producing more work in that area than anybody has ever produced at any time in history. And that there aren't enough there to produce it efficiently, and so on,

is what gives the appearance of inefficiency.

The problem, once you have dealt with it, looks different from inside than outside. It looks quite different. If you took a look at this ship from an external viewpoint, you might find quite a few things to find fault with. But all of that viewpoint would be in total ignorance of what was being done by this ship.

Most of the actions of the Sea Org are invisible to the immediate environment. They're completely invisible. Trying to pull people up the line, casewise, studywise, keeping the ship going—all of those things are actually secondary to the fact that we have our fingers on communication lines and remote communication relay points thousands of miles away. And the number of things which can go wrong at the other end of that line, nobody could imagine. It's not a problem of imagination. It's a problem of unreality and disbelief when you see how many things can go wrong.

All of a sudden, we took our finger off our number a few months ago and somebody cancelled out the Foundations of two major orgs which had, at that time, been making money very well. And immediately that the Foundations were cancelled out, the two major organizations proceeded to collapse. And it just never occurred to anybody, apparently, out at that end of the line, that there was anything wrong with suddenly knocking out their Foundations.

Well, of course, we had to do something about it. We didn't do too much along that line. We got them in, in a hurry. We got them functioning again and I haven't checked up on it recently, but that's the kind of thing that can go wrong. All of a sudden, Washington hasn't got any income and so on, and we look at this and they have given away their CF. They have taken any part of their CF that belonged in any other district—they just bundled it all up and shipped it off to them. And the guys in the other districts didn't use it, you know. And there's Washington with its . . . The things that can go wrong, boy.

So, we watch those things and we do our job on a management line and enforcement capacity, and we get those jobs done. And we do very well at handling these things, but it's at internal expense, almost always. It's like, "Who are we going to send to New York? Well, we've got to send two people to New York, and they've got to be leaving by tomorrow afternoon." And all of sudden, why, there's no Cook and no Chief Officer on the ship. Because these outer lines, of course, tend to take priority. Well, they have priority of importance in getting them done, but when that is always being done at the expense of unmocking the ship's crew and the ship, why, that, do you see, pays off wrong way to.

But somehow or other we keep it going. Since . . . for the last year, we have been fighting an interesting war—and we have been fighting a war; there is no doubt about that. Organizations were given a bad jolt. And through my analysis of the lines and so on, we were able to actually isolate the enemy who had been shooting at Scientology for about eighteen years, undetected. And he's just been sitting there shooting everything to ribbons. And we thought it was other people, and somebody else. In other words, a real covert third-party action.

We've started to clean this up now and things have eased up. But we've just gone through a year of very hectic operation. It is a great tribute to the Sea Org itself that it was able to keep in action and operation, orgs throughout the world.

Now, the Sea Org has this virtue: it has authority. And because somebody at WW or some Executive Secretary of some organization tells people to do such-and-so and so-and-such is no reason at all it's going to get done. Or even, on a long distance communication line, that I write somebody and tell them to do something is no reason it's going to get done. Ordering a thing to be handled and getting it handled happen to be two different things entirely.

There is such a thing as the communication of what you want and the

supervision of getting it done. But also there is another ingredient there which is the authority from which you operate, and that is not in the Key Ingredients. The authority with which you operate.

The Sea Org has a nasty enough, a kind enough, a powerful enough, better-stay-friends-with-them enough type of reputation that it can get things done and handle them. It isn't that somebody else hasn't seen this outness. It's that he didn't have the ethics presence or authority enough to get anything done about it.

It's a very interesting thing. You may find that the whole organization knew that the finance department didn't exist and wasn't banking the money. And yet, strangely enough, nothing happens locally about this. But we note this, and because we are the Sea Org, we call it to somebody's attention—it very often is enough to start some action just by calling it to their attention. And when you follow it up along the lines with proper communication and supervision, you really get things happening at the other end of the line.

Now, it's all right to get things to happen at the other end of the line as long as your planning is accurate enough that the orders you are trying to effect are themselves real and that the things you are trying to correct as outnesses did exist as outnesses. All of these things, don't you see, are contributory to the reality and efficiency of the organization.

So when we send people out to look at things, or when we get information and when we handle things, why, something happens. We have ethics presence. Our reputation is very bad amongst the people who don't like Dianetics and Scientology. I'm sure our reputation is terrible.

The reputation which we enjoy, however, in other quarters, and in Scientology organizations, among Scientologists where we are known at all, is very high. Where somebody has tried to fend us off and not wanted us around, time has demonstrated that they had good reasons for this. We've just had an instance in New York. Somebody has been fending us off, or trying to box us off there for a long time and has caused a lot of trouble over various times. And he blew off, and then the other two guys there who were trying to do this, they blew off, and all of a sudden, the Sea Org was being cooperated with 100 percent and managed to straighten out their tech.

In any event, the operation which we conduct is trying to put together a fourth dynamic, and we're making inroads in that direction and we are doing it from the third dynamic. And we are rather successful at it, being undermanned—actually undermanned, underfinanced, any other “unders” you can think of, except ambitious. We're not underambitious. The amount of action which we will bite off to accomplish is horrifying.

And being, as I say, undermanned and many “under” other things, we still manage to bring it off one way or the other.

Now, in view of the fact that the enemy we have had trouble with has been actually positively known to us for less—at this time I am speaking, for a year, and that he is suffering, very badly and that he has lost his eight top most important people during that time . . . We didn't kill them. We didn't do anything with them. Fate just caught up with them suddenly. These people are very unlucky.

Anybody that would fight anything . . . anybody that would fight anything like Dianetics and Scientology would also be making other enemies in various directions.

So, in any event, we're able to carry on better, and because we have a very concise idea of where we're going and what we are doing, and because we do bring our programs off to execution and so on, why, we will go ahead and make a breakthrough on this. We will go ahead and get up past the make-break point and push it on through.

Undermanning is rather chronic because we tend to be very . . . try to be very particular about recruitment, but it is better to be particular, we have learned, about recruitment than it is to have to handle somebody who is

mostly a case and then he's around underfoot and then he isn't around. It's a little bit better to keep strict lines on that than to lose all the additional motion.

But our targets are made, somehow or another, and they're made definitely on a third dynamic action. The ways we operate, and so on, is a highly coordinated drill, and we make those targets and we are successful with them. And when we're not successful with them the first time, why, we will go ahead and get successful with them the next time. There's constant pressure along these lines to get things accomplished.

And the only thing we really forget is to put a basic crew there that can have the product of an org which then can go on and do its job. And I really don't think there will ever be a time arrive when some engineer or somebody isn't being wakened in the middle of the night and told to get up and go down and get briefed because he is leaving for Keokuk. I don't think that time will probably ever arrive.

But, theoretically, it could arrive if one had enough people. But on a backward look, the income and managerial actions and the things that the Sea Org have made go right over the last two years, if added up, would become a completely incredible record. Nobody could possibly believe that this few people have been able to accomplish that much across as wide a perimeter of the world as we have into the teeth of that much opposition. And the opposition is quite real. And that it's fading down doesn't mean that we can't find another set of birds one of these days to suddenly say, "My God. Those Scientologists had better be done away with before they make everything nice." You know?

Like the undertakers. The undertakers get into cahoots with the government and have vast objections to us because their income is falling.

But the Sea Org quite obviously is a third dynamic activity and the amount of action which is accomplished by the individual Sea Org member probably surpasses anybody's belief.

Oddly enough, this amount of action really isn't directly demanded of the individual. It is his offering, his contribution. And like all elite organizations, they work like hell for very little pay and are highly respected, and out there make up for it to a very marked degree in terms of altitude. And that's the way elite organizations seem to go. The bulk of organizations which have held considerable power on the planet have actually operated, more or less, along those lines. We're fitting into a pattern which is really a very old pattern, in terms of elite organizations.

That doesn't mean it has to be that way, or that it will always be that way. The only thing I hope is that it always will be an elite organization.

Thank you very much.